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Contributory Negligence of Very Young Children
James B. Wilkens*
F IN BACKING YOUR CAR out of a driveway you look to only one side
as you approach the sidewalk, and strike and injure a pedestrian
approaching from the other side, who had been so engrossed in con-
versation with a companion as not to have cast even a glance up the
driveway, your liability for his injuries might well depend upon his
age. The standard of care required (in most circumstances) of normal
adults (and corporations) for the protection of themselves and of others
is that they take such care as ordinary prudent persons would take in
the circumstances. Little, if any, allowance is made for the deviations
of their actual capabilities or experience from those envisioned for the
ordinary prudent person.1 But for children it has long been otherwise.-
In general, where negligence of a child is at issue, the standard of
care to which his behavior is compared is that of an ordinary child of the
same age, intelligence, training, experience, and capacity.3 We do not
discuss, here, the recent tendency to require of children the standard of
care of adults when children are engaged in adult-type activities, such
as driving a car. Thus in our opening scenario, if the injured pedestrian
had been an adult, his recovery from the driver might well have been
completely defeated by a finding of contributory negligence, or reduced
in proportion to his comparative negligence. If the pedestrian had been
a five year old boy, it might equally well have been found that ordinary
five year olds don't look for cars in driveways, that this particular five
year old had no special training or experience which differentiated him
from the ordinary five year old (or alternatively that five is too young
to be chargeable with negligence as a matter of law), and hence that
he was not negligent and could recover from the negligent driver.
The Standard of Care for Very Young Children
While it might be thought somewhat unfair for liability to depend
upon the individual characteristics of one of the parties in some cases,
but not in others, this argument loses much of its force in the face of
the fact that the vast majority of attempts to fasten negligence on
children involve contributory negligence' and only have a practical
effect if the other party's negligence is established. Note also that the
*Ph.D., Cornell University; Third-year student at Cleveland State University, Col-
lege of Law.
1 Prosser, Law of Torts 153ff (3rd ed., West 1964).
2 Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 827, 831 (1938).
3 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 157ff.
4 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 159.
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liability of a defendant arising out of the same course of conduct on
his part can depend upon the characteristics of the plaintiff other than
through the negating mechanism of contributory negligence. Where
circumstances reasonably call for greater or different precautions than
are demanded for the protection of adults to reduce the prospect of
injury to children, the behavior of defendant which violates his duty
of care to a child may not violate his duty to an adult so that a case
of negligence can be made out against him by the child, but not by the
adult.5
Unless one takes the radical view that the application of the doc-
trine of contributory negligence, which receives little sympathy in
either court decisions or in legal literature,6 should be made as un-
reasonable as possible in order to enhance the prospect of eliminating
it altogether, it seems desirable to have its application to children, at
least in broad sweep, be in accord with the clear result of human expe-
rience that children only gradually develop an understanding of the
world in which they live, an ability effectively to respond to and act
upon that world, and an appreciation of the prospective results of their
acts or failures to act in various circumstances.7 In most jurisdictions
the basic rule as to negligence, and more particularly contributory negli-
gence, of children is as indicated above, i.e. they are held to a standard
of care for the protection of themselves or others based on the behavior
in like circumstances of children of similar age, intelligence, training,
experience and capability.8 Thus from requiring of a baby essentially
no care in any circumstances, responsibility for his own behavior is
gradually increased as the child matures (with some attempt to recog-
nize differences in the development of different children in different
environments) until as majority is approached the full responsibility
of an adult is assumed,9 no longer mitigated after majority by personal
characteristics unless these consist of significant, identifiable handicaps.10
Presumptions Based Solely on Age
The expression in statute and case law of the mechanism by which
this transition from irresponsibility to full accountability occurs varies
from one jurisdiction to another. In particular there is diversity as to
5 Audette v. Lindahl, 231 Minn. 239, 42 N.W. 2d 717 (1950); McDermott v. Severe,
202 U.S. 600, 26 S. Ct. 709, 50 L. Ed. 1162 (1905).
6 Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 Yale L. J. 831
(1932).
7 Supra n. 2, at 831.
8 Restatement of the Law 2nd, Torts § 283A, p. 14 (Am. Law Inst., 1965); Jennings
v. Eble, 147 N.E. 2d 139 (Ohio C. P1. 1956), afl'd 105 Ohio App. 51, 143 N.E. 2d 744
(1917).
9 Supra n. 2.
10 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 154ff.
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whether there is some age below which a child is held incapable of (con-
tributory) negligence as a matter of law on the basis of age alone" or
whether each case is to be decided on its own evidence as to the capacity
of the child.12 For a one year old it would rarely, if ever, make any
difference which rule applied, but some states hold absolutely that a
child is incapable of contributory negligence below the age of seven.13
Others have allowed findings of contributory negligence to bar re-
coveries by children less than seven in a wide range of circumstances. 14
The view is expressed by Judge Rodman, dissenting in Walston v.
Greene,15 that since the state commonly deems children of six sufficient-
ly capable of traveling in the vicinity of their homes as to require their
attendance at school, it is reasonable to expect from them some degree
of care for their own and others' safety in circumstances within their ad-
mittedly somewhat limited range of experience, is representative of a
widely held and reasonable position. 1 The alternative positions are
sometimes referred to as the "Massachusetts rule" (no age of incapacity
based on age alone) and the "Illinois rule" (no capacity for contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law below some age, usually seven).17
The possibility that a difference of one day in age can produce a
quantum difference in the outcome under either a conclusive or rebut-
table presumption rule has not escaped comment.1 7 a
An intermediate position is taken in many jurisdictions. Below some
age a presumption of incapacity for negligence is recognized, but evi-
dence may be presented to show that in the particular case the child's
intelligence, training, and experience were such as to make reasonable
the imposition on him of responsibility for anticipating the consequences
of his behavior in the circumstances and of responding in such a fashion
as would have avoided or reduced the damages actually incurred.' s In
jurisdictions where freedom from contributory negligence must be as-
serted by the plaintiff, the existence of such a presumption ordinarily
operates to satisfy the requirement upon mere pleading and proof of
plaintiff's age.19 It is usually held that the question covered by such a
11 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 2d 997, 58 L.R.A. 270 (1902);
Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E. 2d 124 (1958).
12 Dennehy v. Jordan Marsh Co., 321 Mass. 78, 71 N.E. 2d 758 (1947); De Groot v.
Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
13 Supra n. 11.
14 Idzi v. Hobbs, 176 S. 2d 606 (Fla. App. 1965).
15 Supra n. 11.
16 Minsk v. Pitaro, 284 Mass. 109, 113, 187 N.E. 224, 225 (1933).
17 Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N.W. 776, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1936); Bush v.
N.J.&N.Y. Transit Co., 30 N.J. 345, 153 A. 2d 28, 77 A.L.R. 2d 908 (1959).
17a Eckhardt v. Hanson, supra n. 17; Annot., 77 A.L.R. 2d 917, 925 (1961).
18 Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P. 2d 657, 6 A.L.R. 3d 421 (Alaska, 1964); Bush v.
NJ.&N.Y. Transit Co., supra n. 17.
19 Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Mackey, 530 Ohio St. 370, 41 N.E. 980 (1895).
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rebuttable presumption cannot be submitted to the jury unless sufficient
evidence as to the maturity of the plaintiff child has been presented to
render consideration of the question by the jury reasonable. 20 Thus in
a recent Minnesota case it was held that the issue of contributory negli-
gence of a four year old child could not be submitted to the jury in the
face of a presumption of incapacity without some evidence having been
presented as to the intelligence, training, and experience of the par-
ticular child where the jury's information was limited to observation
of the child during the trial.2 1 But in a subsequent case, this holding
was refined to permit a contributory negligence instruction with re-
spect to a five year old child where only meager evidence as to his
capabilities had been presented. Here an instruction was required that
he was presumed to have been using reasonable care for his own safety
unless the jury found the weight of the evidence to show the contrary,
on the ground that to require the jury to consider the evidence bearing
on the presumption of due care by the child without an instruction as to
the standard of care demanded would be to elevate a rebuttable pre-
sumption into an absolute one. 22
The frequency with which the appellate opinions reflect evidence
out of the mouth of the child's parent to the effect that the child was
brighter and more responsible than average and had been repeatedly
admonished by the parent to guard against the peril which produced his
injury is rather surprising.23 Whether it is the result of especially ef-
fective examination by defense counsel in this type of case or of the
triumph of pride and fear of disapprobation over pecuniary interest
I do not venture to speculate, but it appears to be a phenomenon merit-
ing considerable attention in preparing for trial.
Where the so-called Illinois rule applies, the maximum age of
irresponsibility has frequently been set at seven,2 4 apparently by analogy
to the common law age of irresponsibility under criminal law.2 5 The
validity of this analogy has been much criticized by judges and others
supporting more flexible rules, usually with emphasis on the absence
of a requirement of evil intent in establishing negligence, let alone con-
tributory negligence.20 But it is not entirely clear that the common law
rule in criminal cases was not historically based as much on the notion
that young children tend not to anticipate the physical results of their
actions nor to appreciate the possible consequential hardships stemming
20 Bush v. N.J.&N.Y. Transit Co., supra n. 17.
21 Watts v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 264, 69 N.W. 2d 626 (1955).
22 Rosvold v. Johnson, 169 N.W. 2d 598 (Minn. 1969).
23 Bush v. N.J.&N.Y. Transit Co., supra n. 17.
24 Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1080, 1103 (1948).
25 Walston v. Greene, supra n. 11.
26 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, supra n. 11.
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from these physical results as on the notion that young children are
incapable of, or at least not to be held criminally liable for, mens rea.
History aside, the more flexible rules seem more consonant with the
tenor of civil actions, where the emphasis is on the adjudication of
controversies between parties of equal standing. Perhaps the chief
disadvantage of a rule that children of some very tender age are in-
capable by law of contributory negligence is that such a rule will invite
constant attempts to advance the age for possible imposition of responsi-
bility into a more controversial range, whereas a rule requiring or per-
mitting determination of capacity for negligence in each case as it
arises entails little prospect of producing findings of such capacity in
babies.
Actual Knowledge
Where the evidence shows that the young plaintiff not only under-
stood the nature of the hazard which produced his injury, but also
appreciated that he was himself exposed to risk of such injury, he can
be found contributorily negligent even if he could not be charged
with responsibility for such understanding of the situation by virtue
of his immaturity. 27 Thus actual knowledge of the fact that the in-
strumentality of his injury was capable of inflicting the harm actually
suffered, when coupled with a sensibility of the likelihood of himself
falling its victim, is held to remove the requirement that a child's con-
duct be tested against the conduct of children of similar age and
experience in order to establish contributory negligence on his part.
But without more this does not truly resolve the issue of contributory
negligence, for the question arises of how great a risk of harm the
child was justified in taking in the pursuit of his activities. There have
been no decisions spelling out the proper considerations from which
an answer to that question is to be framed by the jury in cases where
actual knowledge of the risk is said to eliminate the necessity of weigh-
ing the maturity of the child. It would clearly be unfair to require an
adult standard of judgment as to the importance of the child's activities
to be employed in such cases if the same standard were not also em-
ployed in cases where the jury is considering the maturity of the child
relative to his perception of the risk, and there would seem to be little
question but that in the latter situation juries would implicitly use a
standard gauged to the maturity of the child in judging the value of
his enterprise as well as in assessing his responsibility for appreciating
the risk. But to omit instruction on this point, as seems to be the prac-
tice, is to gloss over the very essence of negligence and simultaneously
to expose the child to the risk not just of having his pursuits evaluated
27 Alvarado v. Anderson, 175 Cal. App. 2d 166, 346 P. 2d 73 (1959).
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by an adult standard only because he happened to be unusually knowl-
edgeable about one of the dangers which presented itself, but, even
worse, of not having the value of his activities balanced at all against
the risk perceived.
Assumption of Risk
The problem discussed above is to be distinguished from the doctrine
of assumption of risk, which also applies to children. 28 Thus where
the injured child has "full knowledge of an open and visible condition,
appreciates the dangers incident thereto and voluntarily acts with ref-
erence thereto, he assumes the risk of the attendant dangers." 29 Unlike
contributory negligence, assumption of risk is everywhere an active
defense which must be asserted by the defendant. It will, if proved,
defeat recovery in an action based upon strict liability or upon wilful,
wanton or reckless conduct on the part of defendant and it frankly dis-
avows any pretense of taking into consideration the importance of plain-
tiff's activities.3 0
Violation of Statute
A young child's violation of a statute intended to regulate the
situation which produced injury is in most states held not to constitute
negligence per se 3l or even, in many of those which recognize a con-
clusive presumption of incapacity for negligence in very young chil-
dren, admissible evidence of negligence. 32 Where a violation is per-
mitted to be considered as part of the evidence bearing on the question
of contributory negligence, the child's duty to obey the statute is fre-
quently held not to be absolute, but only to constitute such compliance
as would ordinarily be expected of children of the same age, intelligence
and experience in the same circumstances. 33
Taking a completely different approach, some states recognize no
mitigation at all based on immaturity of the effect of violation of gen-
eral statutes upon the question of contributory negligence, holding usual-
ly that some such words as "No person . . ." or "Any person . . ." in
the statute gives them no scope for formulating mitigating rules. 35 But
this somewhat misguided judicial restraint appears to completely miss
28 Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E. 2d 859 (1950).
29 Id.
30 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 450ff.
31 Fightmaster v. Mode, 31 Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407 (1928).
32 Van Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 P. 62 (1923).
33 Cummings v. Los Angeles County, 14 Cal. Rptr. 668, 363 P. 2d 900 (Cal. 1961).
35 Barney v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co., 126 Mo. 372, 28 S.W. 1069, 26 L.R.A. 847 (1894);
Barcolini v. Atlantic City & Shore R. Co., 82 N.J.L. 107, 81 A. 494 (1911).
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the point that the issue here is not whether there has been a violation
of the statute, but rather what is to be the effect of such a violation in
a civil action. Note also that such reasoning seems to ignore the usual
freedom of youthful offenders from the criminal sanctions of the same
statutes, because of a presumed lack of criminal intent in the very
young or otherwise, and hence leads to adverse civil consequences to
the child from violations of statute for which he is not subject to any
criminal penalty.38
Imputation of Child's Negligence to Parent
In an action based upon injury to a child, but brought by his
parent, guardian, or kinfolk in their own name for such damages to
them as medical expenses or loss of companionship, services or support,
contributory negligence of the child will bar recovery.3 7 In most states
a wrongful death action is subject to defeat by contributory negligence
of the deceased child.3 8 This is usually required by the statute creat-
ing the cause of action, which typically provides that the beneficiary
can only recover if liability could have been found in favor of the
deceased party if he were still alive.39 The basis for the imputation of
the child's contributory negligence to the parent so as to prevent the
parent from recovering this class of damages from a negligent third
party, where not covered by statute, is usually stated to be that the
cause of action is derivative40 or sometimes that it arises by assign-
ment or partial assignment of a cause of action of the child, subject
by virtue of the assignment to all the legal defects of the child's posi-
tion.4 1
The result has been subjected to devastating critical attack over
a long period of time,42 without any apparent effect on the course of
actual decisions.43 The thrust of the criticism, which includes within
its purview derogation of the imputation of contributory negligence
from one spouse to the other in similar actions, has centered on the
fact that recovery for other types of damages, such as injury to his
property, is not barred by his child's (or spouse's) contributory negli-
36 Merz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsylvania, 51 Dickinson L.R. 79
(1946).
37 Fekete v. Schipler, 80 N.J. Super. 538, 194 A. 2d 361 (1963); Schaffner v. Smith,
158 Col. 387, 407 P. 2d 23 (1965); Bonvillian v. Dauphin, 166 S. 2d 40 (La. App. 1964),
review denied 246 La. 859, 167 S. 2d 674 (1964).
38 Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 10 F.R.D. 566 (D.C. Iowa).
39 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 932.
40 Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W. 2d 468, 21 A.L.R. 3d 462 (1966).
41 Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925).
42 Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Chi. L.R. 173 (1935).
43 Supra n. 40; Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d 469, 475 (1968).
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gence. 44 Treatment of the cause of action as resulting from assignment
has also been faulted for logically implying that the cause would have
first existed in the name of the child (or spouse), or in other words
that for there to be an assignee there must logically have been an as-
signor, and this is usually not true, for the child will never have had a
cause of action for medical expenses borne by the parent or for loss
of services to the parent.45
Imputation of Parent's Negligence to Child
In some states it was formerly the rule that for infants so young
that close, continuous parental supervision of their activities was rea-
sonably necessary for their safety, recovery for injuries suffered as a
result of the negligence of a third party would be defeated by negli-
gence of the child's parent or guardian or of a person to whom its care
had been entrusted, despite the fact that negligence by another unre-
lated party contributing to its injury would not have had the same
effect.46 In almost all such jurisdictions this rule has been reversed by
judicial decision 47 or, more commonly, by statute. 48 The rule never
had any logical foundation and was widely condemned on the quite
plausible ground that the child's recovery from a third party who
had been negligent toward him should not be barred by additional
negligence toward him, even if that additional negligence stemmed
from the person responsible for his supervision and safety. 49 No doubt
the motive for the rule was to prevent the proceeds from accruing to
the benefit of the also negligent parent or guardian. 50 There can be
little question that some benefit to parent or guardian, usually flows
from a recovery by very young children. But to give the prevention of
collateral advantage to those not free from fault precedence over pro
viding recovery for the benefit of the innocent damaged party was surely
a perversion of justice of which we are well rid. The modern trend to-
ward permitting tort suits between members of the same family would
make such a rule even more anomalous in present day context than it
was when in sway.
Some remote vestiges of this rule remain in some jurisdictions,
whereby a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of the
44 Gregory, op. cit. supra n. 42.
45 Gregory, op. cit. supra n. 42, at 188.
46 Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, Mpls. & Manitoba Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 336, 13 N.W. 168 (1882);
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 613, 34 Am. Dec. 273 (N.Y. 1839).
47 Mattson v. Minn. N.W. R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N.W. 443 (1905).
48 Rubin v. Olympic Resort, Inc., 24 N.Y. Misc. 2d 131, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 408 (1960);
Zaccari v. U.S., 144 F. Supp. 860 (D.C. Md. 1956).
49 Bellefontaine and Indiana R.R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 98 Am. Dec. 175
(1868).
50 Wymore v. Mahaska Cnty., 78 Iowa 396, 43 N.W. 264 (1889).
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deceased child's estate is subject to defeat by a showing of negligence
on the part of parent or guardian if he is a beneficiary of the estate.51
In some states recovery by the administrator is prevented only where
the negligent parent is the sole beneficiary,52 while in others the judg-
ment is reduced in proportion to the beneficial interest of those charge-
able with negligence.53 Some of the cases in jurisdictions permitting
an administrator to recover for the wrongful death of a child in the
face of a beneficiary parent's negligence appear to distinguish between
"active" negligence by the parent or his agent at the scene of the injury,
but for which the injury would have been avoided despite the defendant's
negligence (in which case recovery by the administrator is barred) and
"remote" negligence consisting of prior acts or failures to act in super-
vision of the child. But where the parent is unaware of the actual peril
overtaking the child and not in a position to prevent it anyhow (in
which case recovery by the administrator for the ultimate benefit of
the parent is permitted).55 This distinction is not merely the last clear
chance doctrine in disguise, for it is not said to depend upon the knowl-
edge of defendant that the parent (or the child) was no longer in a
position to avoid the injury.56 All of these situations represent in form,
if not in ultimate effect, the imputation of the parent's negligence to
the child as contributory negligence.
Conclusion
In this large body of law one can discover such pathologically un-
reasonable examples as the ruling in an old California case that it was,
as a matter of law, not contributory negligence in a six year old boy
run over by a train to have lain down on the tracks, 57 or Judge Cooley's
argument that permitting imputation of the parent's negligence to the
child was desirable to prevent deliberate exposure of children to risk
by their parents in hopes of collecting large judgments for their chil-
dren.58 But on the whole, the law seems to judge young children with
compassion and understanding, and in many cases with more than a
little charity, in determining their responsibility for their own be-
havior in situations where a question of contributory negligence is
presented.
51 Hondl v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 249 Minn. 306, 82 N.W. 2d 245 (1957).
52 Peoples v. Seamon, 249 Ala. 284, 31 S. 2d 88 (1947).
53 Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A. 2d 436 (1939).
55 Cloyes v. Delaware Twp., 23 N.J. 324, 129 A. 2d 1 (1957).
56 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 441.
57 Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 52 Cal. 602 (1878).
58 Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 682, quoted in Tyler v. Weed, supra n. 2,
at 836.
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Nonetheless, the arguments in favor of requiring, or at least per-
mitting, the jury to determine capacity for contributory negligence in
young children seem convincing and, one hopes, will ultimately lead to
reversal of the conclusive presumptions of incapacity based on age
alone. The problem of balancing the value of the child's pursuit against
the apparent risk in cases where he is shown to have actual knowledge
of that risk should be squarely faced and resolved. The situation with
respect to the imputation of contributory negligence to bar "derivative"
suits for expenses and loss of services must probably by now be re-
garded as beyond hope of frank and rational resolution, the status quo
surviving merely because it survives.
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